American trademark law is expanding. The expansion began with the adoption of the Lanham Act in 1947. At that time and ever since, commentators and law makers alike referred to the Lanham Act as a codification of the existing common law. In fact, this codification was a selection and expansion of the common law. The United States has continued to expand trademark jurisprudence: from incontestability, to cybersquatting, to dilution -the notion of what it means to protect a trademark has continued to expand. During this time, the Commerce Clause on which American federal trademark protection is based has not changed.
I. Introduction
In 1994, I predicted that a federal statute protecting trademarks from dilution was a dangerous notion as follows:
A federal statute protecting "super trademarks" from dilution would create a copyright in the mark itself, as well as in the abstract idea of the mark in the minds of the consumer and manufacturers .... Under dilution theory, the trademark holder not only controls each expression of the mark, but also attempts to control the manner in which consumers or other manufacturers perceive of the mark. In this mattel~ dilution theory attempts a monopolization of the idea of the work even outside of any use. In that respect, dilution theory violates the ideal expression dichotomy.' In 2000, I described and analyzed the expansion of American trademark jurisprudence and claimed that the United States had inadvertently created a Civil Law of trademarks, rather than remaining honest to our common law origins. ' In the interim, this predicted expansion has continued unabated. Trademark jurisprudence in the United States has inextricably expanded since the inception of the Lanham Act in 1947.' This article presents several examples of this expansion. Incontestability, a doctrine created with the Lanham Act, was the first step'-' Trademark jurisprudence settled into a groove until 1989 when Congress created the intent-to-use (ITU) system.' In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTOA).' In 2000, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) was enacted.' Throughout the history of the Lanham Act, Section 43(a) has gradually been expanding. However, it received a huge jolt in 1995 when the Supreme Court held that color alone could act as a trademark."
The result of this inextricable expansion is that trademark jurisprudence in the United States is becoming muddled. Originally, trademark protection was justified as a right of exclusion that was granted to the user of a sign for their exclusive use for as long as they used it and to the extent that they used it. Now, the trademark right has come to resemble the moral right of attribution and/or integrity of civil law copyright systems.
This may be appropriate if the nation had a purposeful debate or discussion on turning the United States trademark system into a system of moral rights. However, no such discussion has taken place. I\ather, Congress has enlarged the trademark right at the behest of special interests without paying attention to the consequences: one consequence being that trademark jurisprudence now has a striking resemblance to that of the protection offered by moral rights in civil law countries. 
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Although some American scholars have made a career out of lobbying for moral rights; others have questioned either the necessity" or the desirability" of adopting a moral right scheme. Regardless of how one might come down on this issue, American trademark rights today have come to resemble the moral rights of attribution and integrity. Congress has done this with no discussion or conversation about whether or not this is a good idea. Worse yet, when the Supreme Court has attempted to reign in this expansion, Congress has simply overruled the Court."
Congress seems serious about affecting this expansion. Congress has been pushing this expansion most strongly in the last decade. Congress has been confronted in this expansion by the Supreme Court but to no real effect." This conspiracy of expansion has gone on with no debate or discussion with the American people to decide if society wants an expanded trademark system.
Rathel~ this conspiracy of expansion has resulted in small to medium sized corporations feeling extorted by large corporations over trademark rights." Therefore, this problem is not merely jurisprudential. In fact, it is quite real.
As trademark rights expand to resemble the moral rights of attribution and integrity, they become stronger and broader in scope. When they become stronger and broader in scope, they are asserted more aggressively against competitors. This results in competitors changing their trademarks to avoid conflict. We know this is happening." This article tells the story of how, legislatively, this is done.
Section II presents each major expansion in American trademark history since the Lanham Act was created. Section III portrays the moral rights of attribution and integrity and how trademark protection has come to resemble them. Section IV discusses the tension that has been created between the Supreme Court and 9 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SoUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING II MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STA'IES (2010 Congress over the appropriate scope of trademark protection. Section V presents some normative conclusions that this problem manifests.
II. Doctrinal Expansion
The trademark right in the United States has been on an inextricable course of expansion since (and including) the inception of the Lanham Act. The United States Congress has known only one direction in trademark law: expansion.'" However, the trademark law can expand only so much until it begins to resemble some other law such as the moral right. When it resembles a moral right, the basic theoretical justification for that trademark protection changes." Where it once used to be a right of exclusion limited to the extent of use and the duration of use, its justification has now changed to protection for protection's sake, which is not the original intent of trademark protection.'"
A. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act went through a tortured history before it was finally passed in the days following World War II. There were multiple attempts between 1938 and 1946, when it was finally passed." The legislative history of the Lanham Act tells us that this is a codification statute-no new substantive law was created with the Lanham Act. It merely codified the existing common law with the intention of operating as a registration statute.'" As we shall see, this legislative history has not been realized. Many new substantive rights have been granted. The first is the notion of "incontestability."" A trademark registration can become incontestable anytime after five years of consecutive use of mark on the identified goods or services." 16 17 The Lanham Act's purpose is to protect the relevant consumer and ensure filir competition; it does not confer any property right in a trademark alone. See Unlted Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co" 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such thing as property in a (Tilde-mark, .. "). When protection begins to extend beyond simply indicating the source or origin of a product or service, trademark law is llO longer is serving its originally intendi!d purpose, ld. 
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Given the advantages offered to an incontestable mark, it is remarkably simple to obtain incontestable status. An applicant merely needs to file a Section 15 Affidavit and pay the proscribed fee to obtain an incontestable mark." There is no substantive evaluation of the mark or the claimed use. The PTO merely has a filing clerk check to make sure that the correct people have signed the Section 15 Affidavit and other very simply formalistic requirements." After that, the mark is incontestable.
An for the statute, a trademark owner could never claim that its mark was "conclusive evidence" of anything." A claimant would have to prove each and every element of its cause of action. Therefore, the right of incontestability is quite strong."
If the Lanham Act is a codification of the common law of trademarks," one would naturally wonder where this notion came from. Which state in 1946 had a judicially created notion that would resemble incontestability? Of course, no such state existed. The best record we have of the origin of the notion of incontestability is that it was once fixed in the United Kingdom Trademark Act." In a loose sort of a way, the US common law incorporated the UK common law, but that ended by 1946."
Therefore 
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source or jurisdiction that included a notion of incontestability was the UK. Congress elected to ignore the common law of the rest of the United States and embrace the UK version of incontestability." Therefore, more appropriately, the Lanham Act should be said to be a "codification (of the laws we liked) statute,"
Incontestability was a serious expansion of the trademark law as it existed in the United States in 1946." To be sure, it is a valuable encouragement for firms to register trademarks. Given the incontestability provisions, along with its conclusive evidence provisions, it would seem a violation of corporate fiduciary duties to not claim incontestibility after five years of continuous use.'" However, this is only one of example of many to follow of Congress expanding the trademark right way past any notion of what the Common Law of trademarks had been prior to 1946.
B. Intent To Use
The so-called Intent-to-Use ("ITU")" system is yet another expansion of the American notion of trademark protection. Passed in the Trademark Revision Act of 1988, the ITU system allows a trademark claimant to register its intended use of the mark with the PTO.'" Although section 7(c) of the Lanham Act requires that any effect of the ITU system is "contingent upon registration of the mark,"" in reality the ITU system does grant several important rights that are not contingent upon registration of the mark. By making "registration of the mark" a requirement, Congress attempted to make ITU rights contingent upon use of the mark in commerce, thereby preserving the constitutionality of the lTU system," However, under the ITU system, before the mark is used in commerce, an actual trademark application is filed with the PTO and thereby a record of this application is created. This application will be disclosed in all subsequent and relevant trademark searches. This gives notice to all subsequent actual users of that mark that some entity has claimed priority to that mark," Therefore, although not a part of the statute, an ITU application has a great sig- nificant deterrent effect for the ITU claimant. As firms are naturally conflict adverse:' once a mark with prior ITU rights is discovered in a trademark search, firms will work around such an ITU application, even if no use is ever made. Because the ITU registration gives the applicant three years in which to use the mark," during that three year time period, a third party will not know if actual use will ever occur. As such, that third party would likely steer in a different direction, even if use of the ITU applicant was never to be realized. That is, to risk adverse firms, the ITU system has a real and specific effect, even if all statutory rights are subject to use in actual commerce.
Through the ITU system, trademark rights in the United States have expanded. Without recognizing it as such, the United States has taken a large step toward harmonizing how trademark rights are created. Most Civil Law systems create trademark rights upon registration, not upon use.'" In fact, the ITU system is largely in line with all civil law nations, as use is not required in civil law countries prior to or as a "contingent" _ of registrationY Even though harmonization was not a stated goal for the ITU system when debated by Congress, it does result in a serious expansion of the trademark right and continues the inextricable trend of expansion.
C Dilution
In 1996, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) was signed into law by then President Clinton.'" This law did more to expand American trademark law than any other act of Congress. The FTDA allows a holder of a famous mark the ability to enjoin the use of the same or similar mark on completely unrelated goods or services." Under traditional trademark jurisprudence, before a cause of action for trademark infringement will lie, the defendant has to be in competition with the plaintiff, 44 See COHEN, supra note 43, at 37 (stating that i1. trademark search is "appropriate, and possibly necessary" to avoid costly and lime consuming conflicts with other potential mark holders); 3 McC,wT!w ON TRADEMARKS liND UNFAIR COMl'ETlTfON § 19:6 (4th eeL 2010) (advising companies to "obtain a preliminary determination as to pOSSible conflict with previously used but unregbtered marks, applied-for marks, and registered marks"), For example, although Kodak brand pianos do not infringe the KODAK mark, it does dilute the KODAK mark." Dilution, we are told, is defined as the lessening of the capacity of a mark to distinguish itself." That is, the mere existence of another KODAK mark in the world reduces the famous Kodak Company's ability to distinguish itself. Therefore, it is actionable, even though there is no competition and even though there is demonstratively no confusion possible.
3 ;
Some have claimed that dilution makes the trademark subject to property ownership." Some have argued that it makes the trademark subject to copyright-like protection." Some argue that it is necessary as marks evolve and become famous they must be protected them from freeloaders so that firms will continue to make the investment in the marks.% No one argues however that this was part of the original common law of trademarks. Everyone agrees that it is an expansion of the United States trademark right.
D.ACPA
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) also expanded American trademark jurisprudence. The ACPA was enacted to prevent cybersquatting, the act of using someone else's trademark as a domain name." The ACPA's protection was intended to provide a cause of action for the registering someone else's trademark as a domain name in bad faith."
The ACPA also created in rem jurisdiction. This allows a harmed trademark owner to sue the domain name itself in the event the domain name registrant provides the relevant Registrar with a false name or address." 50 See Lynda J. Oswald, Arliclr:"?umisil1l1clIl" ilnd "Blllrring" 1I11der Ihe Federal 'hlldclIIllrk Dilulioll Act of 1995, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 259 (]999) ("The tr<ldilionai cause of action under trademark law is for infringement, which has its basis in the tort of deceit. Trademark infringement occurs when one party (the junior user) uses a trademark (the jUllior mark) thil! is identicil! or substantially similar to the existing mark (the senior mark) of another user (the senior user) on competing goods, such that prospective purchasers are likely to be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the identity or source of the goods involved."). was created by Congress in part to "encourage trademark holders to invest in their marks to achicve the famous mark status and to recognize the investments that mark holders have made in making their marks famous."); JEROME GILSO,~, Ti<ADEMARK PROTEnIO~' AND PRACflCE, § 5A.D1(4)(a) (4th ed., Matthew Bench ed., 4th ed., 2004). 'The abundant goodwill and consumer loyalty inspired by a well-known mark is 'the essence of many il successful business' and federal dilution laws protects the substantial investment necessary to advertise and promote the mark" Id.
57 The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACrA) Pub. In expanding trademark law in such a way, Congress has made the possibility of legitimate concurrent uses much less likely and consequently given more control to the holder of the trademark. w This control which permeates cyberspace is similar to the general concept of moral rights which instill an enduring element of control in the creator of a work over their creation.'"
E. Expansion of 43(0)
The expansion of Section 43(a) claims under the Lanham Act are rather notorious." Section 43(a) was first used to protect the shape of the Coke Cola glass bottle."; It has since been used to protect everything from the inside of a Mexican restaurant and its "festive eating atmosphere,"'" to the green-gold color of press pads in the laundry industry,'" to the NBC chimes,'" to the vertically opening motion of a Lamborghini car door."' In Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods., the Supreme Court held that "any" name, symbol, or device that dentified the source or origin of some good or service could be a trademark." The court relied on the word "device" to conclude that even the smell or color of a product could be a trademark if it indicated the source of that good."; Of course, relying on the word "device" for these purposes is historically inaccurate. Originally, the word "device" meant a design mark, not anything under the sun.'" There is no doubt that Section 43(a) has resulted in an expansion of trademark protection in the United States." In 1947, there were few so-called nontraditional trademarks which relied on Section 43(a) for their existence." Since Qualitex in 1995, 
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there have been 688 trademark applications for nontraditional trademarks (excluding product configuration or product packaging, the original justification for Section 43(a).'-' Of course, relying on the word "device" for these purposes is historically inaccurate. It has reached such a bizarre extent that one person was even encouraged to apply to register his own DNA sequence."
III. Moral rights
Much is made of the moral right in the world of copyright. Much more is made of whether the United States should or does comply with its treaty obligations under the Berne Convention that mandates the protection of some moral rights." The protection of moral rights as such fundamentally sets the Civil Law apart from the Common Law of copyright." Moral rights include rights of attribution, integrity, divulgation and withdrawal."
In countries that recognize moral rights, for example, it is a violation of the moral right of integrity to colorize motion pictures if the original author objects. One way of expressing this difference is that the Civil Law recognizes the personalityn of a work, while the Common Law only recognizes an economic interest in the work."
Although the moral right was originally saved for individuals and not corporations, some countries, such as Japan, consider a corporation a juridical person and, as such, recognize a corporation's ability to maintain and enforce moral rights.
M As such, it is not inconsistent to express a corporation as an owner of the moral right of trademark.
This distinction in copyright between Civil Law nations such as France and Japan compared to the United States is quite remarkable. It leads to many international disputes regarding the appropriate scope of the copyright."
A similar distinction exists in trademark between Civil Law countries and the United States. The trademark right in Civil Law countries is usually justified as a property right." It is accepted that the trademark is subject to property ownership. Conversely, in the United States, the trademark jurisprudence heretofore has been recognized as a right of exclusion based merely on priority of appropriation."' One owns the right to exclude others from marks which one has priority to, but does not own the mark itself."' As I predicted it would in 1994,~ the concept of dilution has driven a major seachange in American trademark jurisprudence. The trademark right in the United States has slowly come to be far more similar to the nature and extent of moral right protection, rather than the mere right to exclude. Now, the United States recognizes the personality of a trademark and the Civil Law nations continue to recognize it as an economic right. The significance is that, once again, the Civil Law and the United States do not share an understanding of what a trademark right confers. Therefore, the basis jurisprudence of American trademark law and that of the Civil Law remains disparate.
The moral rights doctrine is a very broad idea that is said to protect the "personality" of a work." This doctrine gives the author the right to claim authorship of a work (right of attribution or right of paternity); the right to object to changes, modifications, or bastardizations of the a work (right of integrity); the right share or not share a work with the public (right of divulgation); and the right to remove a work from the public after publication (right of withdrawal)," Moral rights protect the "personal, intellectual, and spiritual interests of the author."&; The notion is that the author merges him or herself with the work and as such the work becomes part of their personality. As such, just as one may not sell part of your body, one cannot alienate a moral or personal right in a work. My contention here is that as the trademark grows in strength and stature, lower courts and the United States Congress have come to protect the mark as a personality worthy of protection as if it were a work of the creator.
As the United States trademark right expands in scope, this notion can apply to describe the functioning of the United States trademark right. Although the moral right is inalienable in most coun- 84 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rcctanus Co., 248 U.s. 90, 97 (1918)("There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed. The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfilir competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business,") 85 That a trademark dilution statute would create a copyight in trademarks that protect even the idea of a trademark, is precisely what has happened.
86 "Work" is the term for the object of copyright protection. 
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tries that recognize the moral rightW and, of course, the United States trademark is completely alienable, moral rights actually do describe the United States trademark right as to the immediate holder of that right, whether an original creator or an assignee. A member of the Berne Convention is mandated to provide protection for two of these moral rights (attribution and integrity)'" and most Civil Law countries do. There is great debate about whether or not the United States in compliance with this requirement even though it ratified the Berne convention in 1989."
The phrase droit moral ("moral right") was first used as a legal term of art by the prominent French jurist Andre Morillot in 1878." In Cinquin c. Lecocq;) before the Cour de Cassation, Morillot asserted that the property rights of an artistic work under copyright was not community property between spouses, but rather belonged solely to the creator." This concept grew out of the philosophy of individualism that thrived in France following the French Revolution,95 Although the court disagreed, the court did recognize that the artist-husband alone possessed distinct moral rights over his creation,"
Following this acknowledgment, European courts struggled over which two German philosophies to adopt: Immanuel Kant's monist system or Georg Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel's dualist system." Kant's model revolved around the concept that a work of art is not merely an external object, but rather is an expression of the creator's personality."' Hegel's conception differed in his belief that the work itself is necessary for the manifestation of the artist's personality; therefore the artistic work is property to which the artist's personality is inseparably attached." In the early 1900's, German Jurist Joseph Kohler further developed Hegel's theories defining how an economic right in the artistic creation may simultaneously co-exist with the personal rights in its creator.'"" Morillot argued under the dualist concept, and after court's decision in Cinquin C. Lecocq this notion prevailed in France. '" Some moral rights scholars would dismiss the argument that trademarks in the United States have become subject to protection akin to moral rights out of hand.
A. Attribution
The moral right of attribution is "perhaps the most important moral right.""3 The right of attribution allows an author to claim a work as their own. This claim gives an author the ability to object, essentially, to a likelihood of confusion'"' over the source of a work. In Europe, this is known as the right of paternity. '03 It allows an author to claim or not claim that he/ she is the author of any given work. This is most analogous to the source denoting function in trademarks. The source denoting function tells a purchaser 100 rd. ill 372.
from where a product emanates. In fact, "[ilt is the source-denoting function that trademark laws protect, and nothing more."'" As we shall see, the American trademark right has come to protect far more than the mere source denoting capacity of the trademark.
The right of attribution first had roots in ancient Rome, which recognized the growing problem of plagiarism. '" To provide relief to the angry authors, a cause of action known as plagium, meaning "the crime of stealing a human being" was created in the first century A.D."" As the Roman Empire declined and Europe plunged into the dark ages, these concepts bowed to the authority of the Catholic Church, which gave little or no attribution to individual artists."" It wasn't until the Renaissance era when these rights began to reappear.""
In 1498 The trademark right of source denoting has become analogous to the moral right of attribution. Today, when trademark users apply their marks to their goods or services, trademark jurisprudence supports their claim as if it were carved in stone. Source denoting has become much more signficant than merely letting consumers know from where a product eminates. Now, a famous mark can exclude all uses of noncompeting marks that do no confuse. Now, a holder of a trademark can prevent its registration as a domain name even if there is no confusion. Since the inception of incontestability, the holder of an incontestable mark may prevent others from using it even if it merely descriptive and therefore no trademark at all. In this way, holders of trademarks have come to hold something that seems akin to the moral right of attribution for their marks.
B. Integrity
The moral right of integrity protects a copyrighted work from change or mutilation. This gives authors the exclusive right to display their work in the original form and protects against any distortion of that original expression. '" "To deform his work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject to criticism for work he has not done."'"
The best example of the right of integrity in operation is the battle over the colorization of movies. When a French television station, La Cinq, gained purported rights (from an assignee of the copyrights) to colorize John Huston's The Asphalt Jungle, his heirs filed suit claiming a violation of their father's moral right of integrity.'" Although Huston's heirs lost the case at the lower court because the court found that the television company did not colorize the original copy of the movie,''' the French Supreme Court reversed and found Huston's right of integrity infringed because Huston had created the movie. '" The Court ordered some $100,000 in damages to be paid to the Huston heirs and that the colorized film be destroyed.'" The right of integrity is very analogous to the dilution prevention right in trademark law."o For example, a Paris District Court prohibited a director from putting on the play, Waiting for Godat, casting all actresses because it interfered with the playwright's intention that the roles be played by men.'" The court's decision was grounded in the desire to protect the playwright's moral right of integrity which would have been violated had the director tainted the nature of the play by using all actresses.''' Also, an Indian court found that the destruction of a publically recognized sculpture amounted to mutilation of the sculptural work and consequently a violation of his moral right of integrity regardless of the location at which the destruction took place.'''
The right of integrity is very analogous to the dilution right in the United States. Now, selling Kodak brand pianos violates the integrity of the famous Kodak brand.
The mere fact that another Kodak is on the market lessens the capacity of Kodak to distinguish itself in the minds of potential consumers, just as a moral right artist has the right to protect the integrity of his/her work. Buick brand aspirin, we are told in the legislative history, dilutes the famous mark for an automobile. If Buick can prevent a third party from naming their aspirin "BUICK", far more is going on than the right of exclusion. Here, it is only theoretically justified if one accepts that the automobile manufacturer's right of integrity is being violated. That is, the very integrity of the aura surrounding the mark BUICK is destroyed. When the association is made with aspirin, the former distinctiveness of the mark BUICK is lessened (or destroyed). To allow the owner of BUICK to prevent this destruction allows that entity the right to prevent damage to the integrity of the mark.
As such, the trademark BUICK is now protected as if it were appropriate subject matter of the moral right of integrity. 
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IV. Tension between the Courts and the Congress on Trademark Jurisprudence
A. Dilution Primarily at the Supreme Court level, there has been much tension between the Court and Congress as to the scope of the trademark. The best example of this is the Victoria's Secret case.''' In that case, the Supreme Court held that a claimant of dilution had to show that its mark was "actually diluted," a "likelihood of dilution" was not enough.''' Without saying what precisely (other than a presumption that absolute identical marks would be enough)'" constituted "actual dilution," the Court changed the analysis of when a trademark right was harmed. Up to that point, the test had always been a "likelihood" of infringement. To change this to a requirement that the claimant had to show evidence of actual harm, when the alleged harm from dilution is remarkably speculative at best, was to nearly extinguish the cause of action. In the reported cases, after the Victoria Secret case, the number of cases plummeted.'" However, Congress, at the behest of Limited Brands, Inc., Victoria's Secret' PAC and Jack Valenti,''' the most influential lobbyist in the 2006 election year, expressly overruled the Supreme Court in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) of 2006.'" According to the TDRA, the appropriate standard of when a mark is diluted is now a "likelihood of dilution.""" Not surprisingly, the number of cases based on a dilution claim has rebounded. '"
B. Fair Use
In KP Permanent Makeup v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc.,'" the Supreme Court attempted to further restrict the expansion of the trademark right. There, the Court held that fair use (and therefore a finding of non-infringement) consisted of conduct where a third party used a descriptive mark descriptively.'" If this happened, there would be no infringement and the defendant would not be required to make a showing of a lack of confusion. '"
The fair use doctrine is yet to be countered by Congress. Perhaps they agree; perhaps there are more important issues on their plate. Regardless, the fair use doctrine may operate to provide the brake to the expansion of trademark jurisprudence that is required if we are to maintain balance between trademark holders and consumers. n·. Wal-mart sent pictures of Samara's clothing to its designer in the Philippines with instructions to copy it.'~ In many of the pictures, Samara's label was visible and Samara's trademark was apparent.'" Yet, the Court found that the Lanham Act was not infringed because Samara's clothing had not attained a secondary meaning in the market place. ,,, The Court dismissed Samara's claim in a short, 11 page opinion and created new categories for trade dress protection. They determined that there were three types of trade dress: product design, product packaging, and a tertium quid.'" As Samara's claim was categorized as product design, they were required to show secondary meaning where product packaging is protected without secondary meaning.'" The tertium quid doesn't stand up to any sophisticated analysis.
Next, in TrafFix Devices Inc v. Marketing Displays Inc.,''' in 2001, the Supreme Court held that road-side signs with spring loaded legs so they would stand up in the wind were functional and therefore not protectable trade dress. The Court held that the claimed trade dress was function because it was "essential to the use or purpose of the article.""" Through the functionality doctrine, the Supreme Court greatly restricted the expansion of the trademark right.
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,''' the Court found that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act could not operate as an alternative to copyright protection even though the plaintiff could establish that it was the successor in interest to the actual source of the video.'~ In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., ,;9 also in 2003, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard for a finding of trademark dilution was "actual dilution" rather than the far lesser standard of a "likelihood" of dilution. The Court resolved a debate regarding interpretation of the Lanham Act and whether the standard for dilution should be the same as the standard for infringement. The Court elected to use the higher standard and require actual harm to be show whether than a merely likelihood, the standard for infringement.
Finally, in 2004, in KP Permanent MakeUp, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,''' the Court again restricted the trademark right at issue and determined that a regLstered trademark that was descriptive had to endure other fair uses of that mark so long as they amounted to a descriptive mark being used descriptively.
Therefore, put in this light, it is clear tha t the Supreme Court in the last decade has been attempting to reign in the trademark right.
In the mean time, Congress continues to expand trademark jurisprudence. Congress passed first the lTU statute, where a party's mere intent to use a mark can be preserved for three years.'"' Congress passed the original dilution statute'" and then the Trademark Dilution Revision Act'" which expressly overruled the Victoria's Secret case."" Congress created the ACPA,'65 allOWing, for the first time in American history, Instead, today, the personality of the trademark is protected. The source denoting function of trademark protection has been usurped by Congress. That right is now better described as the right of attribution. Trademark owners are no longer the owner of just a right to exclude others to the extent they use the mark and for as long as they use the mark. Now, the source denoting function of a mark has become a moral right of attribution: a personal right of the holder of the trademark.
When a famous mark is used on unrelated goods today, Congress and the lower courts claim that the mark as been diluted. However, there is no conceptual justification under the original trademark jurisprudence in the United States to support the notion of trademark dilution. ,;0 It is fully supported if one accepts the moral right of integrity of a mark. Under this notion, any subsequent use by anyone on unrelated goods operates just like the moral right of integrity. The trademark owner has the absolute right to protect the integrity (Congress this the protection of distinctiveness)"" of its mark.
Therefore, the nature of trademark jurisprudence in America has changed. In the times of Learned Hand, it was a mere tort where harm in the form of confusion had to be alleged and proved before
